Why IXPs matter: Critical Infrastructures beyond the rhetoric

Teaching

• IXPs are not simply technical «optimisers», but systemic stabilisers; ;

• A failure can cause massive routing problems, congestion and service unavailability; ;

• National Internet resilience is highly dependent on the robustness, governance and redundancy of local IXPs.

IXP and resilience: From crisis buffer to digital sovereignty

IXPs as buffers in times of crisis

When we talk about resilience, the focus is often on backbone operators, submarine cables or DNS. But IXPs quietly play a key role in cushioning crises, locating traffic and preserving critical connectivity.

Local traffic, local impact

IXPs reduce dependence on long-distance transit routes. By enabling networks to exchange data locally, they provide both latency gains and a structural advantage: autonomy. In the event of a crisis (war, disaster), this autonomy becomes resilience. For example, during the war in Ukraine, local operators maintained minimal connectivity via local peering, limiting international exposure. Conversely, countries with an underdeveloped peering ecosystem remain vulnerable when it comes to routing.

IXPs as shock absorbers

Without a solid or well-governed IXP, the effect of breakdowns (energy, cyber attacks, embargoes) is amplified. Recent examples:

• Kenya, 2023: power cut, local traffic switched to international routes, with deterioration in quality ;

• Sudan: repeated cuts, lack of IXP worsens isolation ;

• Iberian Peninsula, 2025: major breakdown, Portuguese traffic reduced by 90%, but Spain holds up better, partly thanks to a higher IXP density.

These cases underline the fact that an IXP is not just a router, it's a crisis buffer.

Strategic sovereignty

A country with robust and neutral IXPs:

• is less dependent on the international arena; ;

• can apply its security policies more effectively; ;

• has greater visibility of local traffic; ;

• promotes regional development and inclusion.

In Russia, the conflict in the Ukraine resulted in extensive centralisation of IXP control. In Ukraine, decentralisation and agile failover capability were vital. In Brazil, debates on neutrality led to the strengthening of IX.br as a pillar of sovereignty as well as performance.

The risk of centralised peering

Sovereignty and resilience are threatened if the IXP infrastructure is concentrated: risks of single failure, abuse of dominant position, lack of transparency, dependence for small networks. A multi-IXP ecosystem, governed in an open and federated way, mitigates these risks: neutrality is a structural condition.

Recognising IXPs as critical infrastructure: what needs to change

Despite their central role, very few countries classify IXPs as critical infrastructure - the focus often being on submarine cables, datacentres or DNS.

Governance: Transparency before size

Many IXPs start out small and associative. But their governance often remains informal, a risk when traffic increases. Key principles :

• Neutral ownership (no single dominant commercial player) ;

• Multi-stakeholder governance (operators, universities, civil society, etc.) ;

• Publication of statistics, membership and pricing policies ;

• Back-up plans and redundant infrastructure.

Otherwise, the IXP becomes a technical failure point... and an institutional one.

Technical hygiene: routing security and observability

To be resilient, IXPs must be secure and observable:

• Route server filtering (prefix/AS-path validation) ;

• RPKI support and BGP supervision tools ;

• Public interfaces (Looking Glass, IXP Manager, etc.) ;

• Participation in best practice programmes (e.g. MANRS).

It's not a luxury: in a world of BGP leaks, hijacking and cyberthreats, it's a minimum.

Politics: From recognition to resilience

Few pieces of legislation include IXPs in lists of critical infrastructures. They should be included in :

• national cyber security strategies ;

• regulatory frameworks for network resilience (NIS2, CER, etc.); ;

• funding arrangements for incident preparation.

At European level, IXPs could be integrated into schemes such as CEF Digital, or under the supervision of ENISA.

A federated model for continental resilience

The European IXP ecosystem is dense but fragmented, which is a strength (no single focal point) but also a coordination challenge. Possible recommendations:

• A European IXP resilience observatory (RIPE, Euro-IX, ENISA, etc.); ;

• A shared framework for responding to incidents targeting IXPs ;

• Voluntary audits, federated supervision of best practice.

The aim is not to impose a single form of governance, but to strengthen coordination and transparency.

Conclusion

IXPs are not «simple switches». They are interconnection commons, supporting openness, decentralisation and collaboration. Recognising them as critical infrastructure is not a symbol, it is a technical imperative.

This means investing in their resilience, governance and neutrality. Whether it's maintaining a village's local connection during a blackout, or buffering continental geopolitical shocks, IXPs are the silent guarantors of continuity. Their impact is evident whenever traffic remains local, and whenever a crisis is absorbed rather than amplified.

Preparing for the Internet of the future requires integrating IXPs into national and European resilience strategies, ensuring transparent governance, funding redundancy, and promoting cross-border cooperation. At a time when connectivity is vital for the economy, democracy and security, ignoring IXPs means leaving a critical gap in our collective defences. A resilient Internet requires resilient IXPs.

The future lies in diversity, neutrality, transparency and cooperation... exactly the spirit that has made the Internet such a success.